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is a significant step in the direction of making cure a viable tool
for enforcing such obligation as well as for requiring good
faith negotiations between the parties to resolve their diffi-
culties within the framework of the contract.
Zoning: Billboard Ordinance Based on
Aesthetics Held Constitutional
Petitioner had constructed a serm.ce station and diner adja-
cent to a highway and was erecting two signs on the other side
for advertising. The building inspector served a stop order on
the ground that the signs violated a town zoning ordinance.' On
appeal from the zoning board's approval of the stop order, peti-
tioner asserted that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The
petition was dismissed on the ground that the ordinance merely
regulated but did not prohibit billboards.2 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that a zoning ordinance based pri-
marily on aesthetic considerations is constitutional. Cromwell
v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
Zoning regulations are authorized under the state police
power3 to promote the general welfare of the community by
protecting the usefulness and value of property under a com-
prehensive system of land use regulation. Because the concept
of police power is constantly being expanded by the courts to
meet additional public demands,4 areas develop in which the
border between regulation and infringement upon the consti-
1. The town zoning ordinance set forth a comprehensive plan for
the regulation of signs. The town was zoned into a number of use
districts, with provisions regulating the size, location, and number of
signs per district. Since the regulations covered only signs which were
"related to an establishment located on the same lot" ("accessory"
signs), "nonaccessory" signs were implicitly prohibited throughout the
township.
2. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 24 App. Div. 2d 998, 266 N.Y.S.2d 188
(1965).
3. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659
(1962); Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 40 Misc. 2d 259,
243 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1963), af~fd, 22 App. Div. 2d 895, 255 N.Y.S.2d
411 (1964).
The police power may be generally defined as the power of the
state to regulate the conduct of individuals within its jurisdiction in
order to promote health, safety, and morality, and to further the gen-
eral welfare. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962).
4. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Oregon City v. Hartke,
240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
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tutional rights of individuals becomes unclear. Zoning regula-
tions which are designed to achieve aesthetic ends have long
existed in this border area.5
The problem of the application of aesthetics to zoning regu-
lations aimed at billboard control developed with the advent of
outdoor advertising in the 1890's. Community officials responded
to outraged public sensibilities by adopting ordinances regulating
and sometimes entirely prohibiting billboard advertising. 6 The
courts reacted unfavorably toward these ordinances, holding
them invalid on the ground that they were enacted solely for
aesthetic purposes and therefore not within the scope of the
police power.7 Aesthetic considerations were deemed a luxury
and an indulgence, not a necessity which justified the exercise
of the police power to take private property without compen-
sation.8
The earliest case upholding an ordinance regulating the size,
location, and manner of construction of billboards was St.
Louis Gunning Advertising Company v. St. Louis.9 The case
departed from prior law, but did so by fitting the regulations
within the police power to promote health, safety, and morality,10
5. Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the
Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 149, 154 (1954); see Comment, Zoning,
Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 COLum. L. REV. 81, 83 (1964).
For a general discussion of the role of aesthetics in zoning legisla-
tion, see Angor, Beauty Begins A Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations
in Zoning, 11 J. PUB. L. 260 (1962); Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic
Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw & CoNTEMPT. PROB. 218 (1955); Nor-
ton, Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAw. 171
(1967); Note, Aesthetic Zoning: An Answer to Billboard Blight, 19
SYRACUSE L. Rav. 87 (1967).
6. Dukeminier, supra note 5; Rodda, supra note 5.
7. E.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867(1909); Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107
P. 261 (1910); Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 214 I. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905);
Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72
N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905); People ex rel. Wineburgh
Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E. 17 (1909).
8. See, e.g., Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign
Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
9. 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761
(1913).
10. The court found that billboards were publicly dangerous be-
cause they were fire hazards and could be blown down by high winds
thereby injuring passers-by; that they were deleterious to the public
health in that the area surrounding them was used as privies and dump-
ing ground for all kinds of waste; that they afforded shelter for crimi-
nals and concealment for immoral acts; and that they obstructed light
and air. See also Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526
(1917); Ex parte Savage, 63 Tex. Crim. 285, 141 S.W. 244 (1911).
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not by recognizing the validity of aesthetic considerations in zon-
ing. Subsequent decisions began to expand the traditional basis
of the police power to include some aesthetic considerations."
Some courts used language which seemed to imply that even
if the regulation of billboards did not rest upon the traditional
grounds, the preservation of scenic beauty would be sufficient
support for the ordinances.' 2 Other courts upheld billboard
ordinances by analogy of regulation of offensive eyesores under
the police power to regulation of offensive sounds and odors
under the law of nuisance. 13
In New York, an expansion of the .concept of general welfare
began as early as 1931 when the court of appeals, although in-
validating an aesthetic ordinance, acknowledged the growing im-
portance of aesthetic considerations.Y4 By 1940, a lower New
York court recognized the general public acceptance of the
idea that the creation of beauty in a city or village tends to
promote the happiness, contentment, comfort, prosperity, and
11. In General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub.
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 187, 193 N.E. 799, 816, appeal dismissed sub nom.
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Callanan, 296 U.S. 543 (1935), the
court held that
it is . . . within the reasonable scope of the police power to
preserve from destruction the scenic beauties bestowed on the
commonwealth by nature in conjunction with the promotion of
safety of travel on the public ways and the protection of travel-
ers from the intrusion of unwelcome advertisers.
Id. at 187, 193 N.E. at 816.
See Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177
(1944); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court,
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Presnell v.
Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 144 N.E.2d 381, 165 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1957); Perlmutter
v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932); Criterion Serv., Inc. v. City of
East Cleveland, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 90, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed, 152 Ohio St. 416, 89 N.E.2d 475 (1949).
12. See Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19
(1936); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works,
289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of
Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
13. See General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis
Dep't of Pub. Works, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930); Ghaster Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 2C0 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Moore,
Regulation of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Purposes, 8 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 191, 200 (1963).
14. Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 230, 177 N.E.
427, 430 (1931). This expansion of the public welfare concept in the
zoning area is also reflected in Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153,
214 P. 99 (1923), where the court sustained a general zoning ordi-
nance which excluded business from residential districts, stating: "There
is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which may
be fostered with reasonable limitations .... Such legislation is merely
a liberalized application of the general welfare purposes of state and
federal constitutions." Id. at 157, 214 P. at 101.
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general welfare of its citizens. The court inferred that judicial
acceptance would ultimately follow.15
The United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker6
included aesthetics in the expanding scope of the concept of
general welfare. Without dissent, the Court ruled that the Dis-
trict of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 was constitutional
as applied to the taking of a certain commercial building and
land under the power of eminent domain. Stating that the con-
cept of the public welfare includes spiritual and aesthetic as
well as physical and monetary values, the Court concluded that
a legislature has the power to determine that a community
should be beautiful as well as healthy.17 Although Berman
dealt with a taking under the power of eminent domain, it was
applied to zoning under the police power.' 8
The most recent development prior to acceptance of the
validity of aesthetic zoning ordinances was the adoption of a
property value rationale to sustain zoning ordinances clearly
designed to promote the beauty of the community. This ra-
tionale was applied in State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corporation v. Wieland'O to uphold an ordinance requiring a
determination by village officials, before issuance of a build-
ing permit, that the exterior architectural appeal and func-
tional plan of the proposed structure would not be so at vari-
ance with those of the neighborhood as to cause a substan-
tial depreciation in property values. The court based its hold-
ing on the premise that preservation of property values was
within the scope of the police power.20
In People v. Stover,21 the New York Court of Appeals up-
15. Preferred Tires v. Village of Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 1019,
19 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
16. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
17. Id. at 33.
18. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269
Wis. 262, 272, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955), where it was held that:
While the court in Berman v. Parker... was dealing with the
"due process" clause of the Fifth amendment, . . . and it is the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth amendment which is
applicable to state action, we consider such distinction to be
immaterial in considering the scope of the police power and its
exercise to promote the general welfare.
See also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d
557 (1955). Contra, Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
62, 93, 141 A.2d 851, 863 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
19. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
20. Id. at 270, 69 N.W.2d at 222; Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Re-
view, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); Best v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
21. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
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held the constitutionality of a city ordinance with prohibited the
hanging of clotheslines in front and side yards in residential
areas. The ordinance was sustained "as an attempt to preserve
the residential appearance of the city and its property values by
banning, insofar as practicable, unsightly clotheslines from yards
abutting a public street."22  Stover became the leading author-
ity on the constitutionality of an ordinance based primarily on
aesthetic considerations.23 However, there remained some doubt
as to whether an ordinance of this type would be upheld ex-
clusively on the basis of aesthetics since the Stover court had
addressed itself to the concept of property values and had ar-
gued by analogy to nuisance control.24
The instant case removed any doubt in New York as to the
validity of a zoning ordinance based exclusively on aesthetics.
The court did not mention either the sustaining of property val-
ues or the nuisance theory as bases for its decision. In addition,
the ordinance sustained by the Cromwell court was an even more
severe limitation on the use of private property than the one
sustained in Stover, since it did not allow for exceptions from
the absolute prohibition of all nonaccessory billboards.
25
The Cromwell court, however, while stating that the pur-
pose of all anti-billboard ordinances is primarily aesthetic 26 and
that such a purpose is a constitutionally acceptable basis for
zoning ordinances, failed to establish workable standards to test
the validity of future zoning ordinances based primarily on aes-
thetic considerations. Standards in the area of aesthetic zoning
are particularly necessary because of the existence of a variety
of personal conceptions as to what is or is not beautiful.27 To
uphold land use control legislation based on a standard which is
incapable of definition involves a sacrifice of property rights to
the whims of personal taste.
28
22. Id. at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
23. See Anderson, Regulation of Land. Use for Aesthetic Purposes-
An Appraisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 33 (1963); Sym-
posium, Aesthetic Control of Land Use: A House Built Upon the Sand?,
59 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1964); Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the
First Amendment, 64 CoLum. L. Rv. 81, 90 (1964).
24. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 468, 191 N.E.2d 272, 274,
276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737, 739 (1963).
25. The ordinance in Stover was arguably regulatory rather than
prohibitive, since it expressly provided for the issuance of a permit if
practical difficulty required. See 12 N.Y.2d at 465, 191 N.E.2d at 273,
240 N.Y.S.2d at 735; note 1 supra.
26. 19 N.Y.2d at 269, 225 N.E.2d at 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
27. See Symposium, supra note 23, at 385-92.
28. See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 471, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.
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Other courts have adopted a more conservative approach by
limiting the scope of their approval of aesthetic justification.
Most aesthetic control cases in which restrictive or prohibitive
ordinances were upheld confined their approval to preservation
of beauty in particular areas generally felt to be deserving of
protection.29 Rejecting this type of limitation, the court in the
instant case could have adopted the property value standard
suggested by commentators,30 since it is of more general ap-
plicability. Based upon community opinion, it requires that the
aesthetic merits of a certain use or structure be evaluated on
the basis of changes in the market value of surrounding prop-
erty. Correlation of aesthetics with property values would pro-
vide the courts with an objective standard by which to determine
the extent to which aesthetically motivated legislation actually
furthers the general welfare. In addition, such an objective
standard would enable courts to define practical limits beyond
which aesthetic considerations may not control.8 1
Rather than consider any of the standards proposed by prior
cases or commentaries, the Cromwell court upheld the complete
prohibition of all nonaccessory advertising signs throughout the
township. However, the same type of prohibition had been
struck down by the New York court in 1937 in Mid-State Adver-
tising Corporation v. Bond.32  In that decision the court argued
that even if aesthetic or cultural reasons demanded restrictions
on outdoor advertising, the court could not sustain a prohibi-
tion which included all land in the city and which did not de-
fine the structures proscribed or provide some other appropriate
standard of regulation.33 The Bond court thus foresaw the pos-
2d 734 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965); Moore, supra note 13, at 195.
29. See, e.g., General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. City of Indianapo-
lis Dep't of Pub. Works, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930) (parks and
boulevards); New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941)
(the French Quarter); State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154
La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923) (residential districts); General Outdoor Adv.
Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935) (places
of historical interest); 47 CorNr=i L.Q. 647 (1962).
30. See, e.g., Note, The Administration of Zoning Flexibility De-
vices: An Explanation for Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 M=. L. REv.
973, 980 (1965).
31. Comment, supra note 5, at 90.
32. 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937). See Norate Corp. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965); United Advertising
Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 76 N.J. Super. 301, 184 A.2d 441 (1962).
33. If the Cromwell court meant to infer that no standards are
necessary, it could have cited Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400
P.2d 255 (1965), where the Oregon court upheld an ordinance which,
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sibility of aesthetically motivated legislation, but it refused to
recognize legislation devoid of standards, as the Cromwell court
did thirty years later.
A second problem with the court's decision in the instant
case arises from the court's conclusion that the accessory-non-
accessory distinction in the ordinance was not discriminatory.
This blurs rather than clarifies the court's position on the scope
of aesthetic purpose. The reasoning offered in support of the
distinction is that accessory signs are part of the business itself,
and the right to conduct a business in a district carries with
it the right to maintain a business sign on the premises. Non-
accessory signs, on the other hand, are erected pursuant to
the business of outdoor advertising itself, and the nature of this
business justifies the separate classification.34 The cases cited in
Cromwell in support of the proposition that no discrimination
exists upheld ordinances which prohibited nonaccessory signs in
certain areas of a town but not in others.35 Cromwell may be
distinguished because the ordinance in question prohibited all
nonaccessory signs throughout the township.
If we are to accept the proposition that zoning for aesthetic
purposes is permissible, then the accessory-nonaccessory classifi-
cation is not very convincing. A sign which is aesthetically
undesirable when not erected on business premises does not be-
come desirable when placed on the business premises. Further-
more, the petitioner's signs in Cromwell were not erected pursu-
ant to the business of advertising, but for the purpose of ad-
vertising a business which was located directly across the street.36
Since the accessory-nonaccessory distinction is not consistent
without standards, prohibited all automobile wrecking yards within
the city solely on the basis of aesthetics.
34. See United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J.
144, 150, 93 A.2d 362, 365 (1962). However, it should be noted that the
ordinance involved in United Advertising allowed authorization by the
local board of adjustment for the continued use of already existing signs.
35. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d 270,
30 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1963); Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn.
292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Ghaster Props. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425,
200 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d
762 (1961).
36. See Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960),
which dealt with an ordinance limiting the size of signs in business and
industrial districts and putting them in two classifications denominated
"point of sale" and "non-point of sale." In the first class, wall signs
were unlimited in size; in the second class, wall signs were limited to
300 square feet and all others 180 square feet. Although aesthetics
was the criterion by which the court judged the ordinance, it held the
ordinance invalid as being unreasonable and discriminatory.
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with the aesthetic purpose rationale, the court's approval would
seem to indicate an underlying assumption that there is in fact
some limitation on the extent to which regulation can be justi-
fied solely by its aesthetic purpose. The opinion implies that the
degree of infringement on private property rights is the limiting
factor. The court seemed to be concerned with the possible
eminent domain problems in prohibiting all signs, 37 but was un-
willing to become involved in the "regulation" and "taking" dis-
tinction.38 As such, the opinion leaves to speculation the court's
intention in upholding the accessory-nonaccessory distinction.
The Cromwell case is the latest in a series of decisions which
has gradually expanded the police power to include aesthetically
motivated legislation. Courts are no longer attempting to find
nonaesthetic justifications for billboard regulations which are
obviously aesthetically motivated. They have reached the in-
evitable result that aesthetics is a valid legislative concern. How-
ever, by failing to establish reasonable standards, the extent of
the Cromwell decision is unknown. It is difficult to determine
whether billboards are the sole object of the holding, or whether
it will extend to all aesthetically undesirable structures. Future
courts have not been provided with any reasoning upon which
they may base their decisions. Consequently, the New York
court may be forced to re-examine its decision in Cromwell
before the full implication of that decision is known.
37. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1314 (1958).
38. This distinction is discussed in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962).
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